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
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


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# OLAF looking forward

## Foreword

As the recently appointed Director-General of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), I am honoured to present this Annual OLAF Report for the period of 1 January to 31 December 2025.

While I am new to this role, OLAF itself is not new. For 26 years, since its creation in the wake of the clear call to hold EU institutions and the management of public funds to the highest ethical and financial standards, OLAF has stood as a steadfast guardian of the EU budget.

In 2025, OLAF recommended recovering €597 million and prevented €18 million from being unduly spent. The Office opened 254 new cases, concluded 209 investigations, and has 414 ongoing. Last year, nearly €1 billion in revenue was safeguarded. Over the past decade, OLAF has helped retrieve or protect about €6.8 billion. These are not just figures. They are schools built, research projects funded and borders protected. OLAF's work is not abstract and it is not distant. It directly supports Member States and benefits citizens.

We also investigate alleged instances of wrongdoing in the EU institutions and with this mandate comes a moral obligation: EU institutions must embrace transparency. Our internal investigations remain an essential part of the EU's accountability framework, helping ensure that members and staff of the institutions comply with the highest standards of professional conduct and financial integrity. Independence, access to relevant information and the ability to carry out inspections on premises are indispensable for OLAF to fulfil this task.

The European anti-fraud landscape is evolving, notably with the creation of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), which has successfully addressed a critical gap in criminal prosecutions. However, we cannot fix the system just by prosecutions—citizens also want misused funds recovered and returned to the EU budget. OLAF plays a crucial role here. Increasingly fraudsters operate across borders, exploit digital tools and adapt quickly. So must we. Through the ongoing review of the [EU's Anti-Fraud Architecture](#) (AFA), we are actively contributing to create a system that is fit for purpose. In this context, the OLAF Regulation has been evaluated and might be reviewed at the same time as the legal bases of some of our anti-fraud partners. This is a unique opportunity to assess and possibly recalibrate both our day-to-day cooperation, as well as our underlying mandates.

In 2025, OLAF implemented new AI tools to enhance investigations. They help detect fraud-related communications in large data sets, anonymise reports, and manage case documents. OLAF also pioneered digital collaboration by hosting the first Technical Workshop on digital anti-fraud tools in Bucharest. Investing in AI and data analytics is vital for staying one step ahead of fraudsters, while our cross-border experience enables us to connect the dots between Member States, institutions and sectors in ways others cannot.







This added value was visible in 2025. OLAF played a key role in supporting a coordinated crackdown on a [counterfeit cigarette network](#) operating between Italy and Romania. In Ireland, our intelligence contributed to the seizure of [over 4,000 illegally imported e-bikes](#) that had circumvented customs duties, while in Ukraine, we played a key role in uncovering [massive underground pesticide production](#) resulting in the confiscation of more than 175 tons of counterfeit agrochemicals as well as raw materials for their production. Other important investigations are detailed in this report. In each case OLAF collected information from multiple jurisdictions and coordinated with partners to ensure that EU financial interests were protected.

As new challenges continued to emerge, OLAF provided concrete, tangible operational support, including preventing the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus, where our analysis of trade flows and supply chains led to the detection of several schemes rerouting restricted goods through intermediary countries.

Our work goes beyond investigations. Prevention is equally important. In 2025, OLAF experts delivered specialised [training to Ukrainian customs](#) and law enforcement authorities, [with CEPOL](#) we provided advanced anti-fraud intelligence training, and, as every year, contributed to the Commission's annual report on the protection of the EU's financial interests ([so-called PIF report](#)). We also worked closely with the EPPO in complex cases such as the '[Operation Calypso](#)', contributing our expertise and cross-border analysis to complement criminal proceedings.

In the last 15 years OLAF has lost 110 permanent positions. Yet, despite the cuts in resources, the Office remained stable, professional and result-driven. For every euro invested in OLAF, over nine times that amount has been returned to the EU budget. This is thanks to the dedication of staff, whose expertise and integrity are the backbone of this Office.

I would like to congratulate and thank Ville Itälä for his leadership of OLAF over the past seven years, and Salla Saastamoinen for her steady guidance as Acting Director-General. Their work has strengthened this Office and laid solid foundations for the future.



This is a new chapter — but our mission remains the same. We will continue to act with independence, professionalism and determination to protect the financial interests of the European Union and the trust of its citizens.

Thank you.

Petr Klement

Director-General of OLAF





# Trends and figures:

## OLAF in figures: A new perspective

### Investigations



In 2025, OLAF worked hard to protect the EU budget and uphold EU priorities. The Office made 1,142 selections<sup>1</sup> and opened 254 new investigative cases. There are 414 investigations currently ongoing while a total of 209 investigations were successfully concluded, leading to OLAF issuing a total of 216 financial, judicial, disciplinary and administrative recommendations to competent authorities at EU and national level.

Moreover, OLAF recommended that €597 million be recovered while €18 million was prevented from being lost to fraud and wrongdoing.

### Recommendations and recoveries

For the first time this report sets out in detail the results of OLAF's financial recommendations in line with our commitment to provide more granularity on data. In other words, it shows how much money OLAF contributed to return to the EU budget and to prevent from being unduly spent over the last decade. OLAF will continue to provide these figures in future annual reports.

**Amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in 2025 (€ million)**




<sup>1</sup> The selection unit in OLAF analyses any incoming information of potential investigative interest in order to provide an opinion to the Director-General on the opening of an investigations.

## Recovering misused funds: a 10-year overview

In the past 10 years (2016-2025) OLAF recommended for recovery €8.3 billion that was unduly spent and recommended the protection of €873 million.

These investigative activities have already led to the protection of more than **€6.8 billion** for the EU budget (€5.9 billion recovered funds and €0.9 billion prevented from being unduly spent). As the recovery of funds is a complex and lengthy process, the volume of actual recoveries will increase in time, notably for recommendations issued more recently.

Impact of OLAF financial recommendations on the EU budget for the period 2016-2025



## Financial recommendations explained


In general, when OLAF concludes an investigation, it makes recommendations to the competent EU and national authorities, inviting them to take appropriate action to address the potential fraud or irregularities uncovered by the investigation.

Financial recommendations invite competent EU or national authorities to recover amounts that were spent in a fraudulent or irregular way, or to prevent them from being unduly spent. Concerning revenues, OLAF recommendations invite Member States to collect funds (or to prevent losing funds), not duly collected for the EU budget because of fraud or irregularities ([cf. also below, protection against evasion of customs duties and VAT at import](#)).

It is important to note that recovery often involves lengthy administrative and legal proceedings, with entities

prone to bankruptcy or flight, making the recovery rate very unlikely to reach 100%.

While OLAF makes recommendations based on its investigative findings, it does not conduct recovery proceedings itself. Rather, this is done by the EU body or national authority responsible for the original disbursement. Nevertheless, OLAF contributes to improving financial follow-up, for instance through enhanced cooperation with the Commission services concerned. To ensure that the appropriate amounts are returned to the EU budget, OLAF works with the recipients to navigate the complex process leading to effective recovery. OLAF is an important pillar of the EU anti-fraud architecture, with a direct and measurable impact on the EU budget. While actual recoveries of fraudulent or irregular expenditure take time, OLAF's investigations in the last decade have already led to the protection of almost **€6.8 billion** of EU funds and this figure will increase in the future.




## Protecting against evasion of customs duties and VAT at import

One significant aspect of OLAF's work that yields impressive results is protecting EU revenue streams from evasion of customs duties and VAT at the import stage.

In practice OLAF supports customs authorities by identifying undervaluation and origin fraud schemes and provides essential cross-border assistance for the verification and the adjustment of import values. In 2025, work in this area alone had an estimated impact of nearly one billion euro.

### Financial results from OLAF's customs investigations in 2025



**Import duties** evaded recommended to be recovered to customs authorities of EU Member States corresponds to the amount of evaded VAT payments identified by OLAF. We advised Member States' authorities to recover these amounts, thereby increasing a country's general wealth and protecting the EU's budget

**VAT fraud** at import established in OLAF customs fraud investigations corresponds to the amounts lost due to VAT scams at the import level such as undervaluation fraud

**Precautionary measures** sent to customs authorities of EU Member States refer to the amounts recovered by the Member States after being alerted by OLAF

**Amounts prevented from being evaded** as a result of OLAF investigative activities show the amount that OLAF actions in tackling VAT fraud have had on deterring others from carrying out similar schemes. For example, by helping shut down a factory supplying the EU with illicit and untaxed goods, we ensure that fewer illicit goods are introduced in Europe.

# Trends

This report focuses on the fraud trends that our investigators and analysts identified during the year. It presents fraud schemes through case examples and explains how they affect the EU financial interests. It also contains some OLAF-suggested actions to help combat these trends.

OLAF investigations broadly fall into three categories:


- **Expenditure investigations** - investigations into wrongdoings in EU expenditure under direct and shared management, such as EU HORIZON Europe, cohesion and agricultural funds.
- **Customs investigations** - investigations into wrongdoings against EU revenue streams such as customs duties, and into illicit traffics.
- **Internal investigations** - investigations into serious misconducts by any staff and/or members in EU institutions, offices, bodies or agencies.

While some of the trends identified are specific to each category of investigations, others are cross-cutting and can apply to more investigative areas. It is also important, however, to look at the trends relating to incoming information. At OLAF, we receive pieces of information of highly heterogeneous nature and coming from a variety of sources: it may range from an anonymous short email to a fully-fledged legal dossier from a partner authority. OLAF then conducts a preliminary analysis of this information in line with its mandate under the so-called selection procedure to determine whether or not there is 'sufficient suspicion'. In this case our selection team proposes to the Director-General to open a formal investigation. In 2025, OLAF received 4,961 pieces of information, following which 1,142 selections were made.

At the stage of selection, OLAF noticed a number of trends, including:

- steadily higher quantity and quality of incoming information;
- an increase in information relating to wrongdoing in the defence area, especially in research projects or procurement;
- numerous reports of alleged irregularities related to EU agricultural subsidies, in different Member States (such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, etc);
- significant increase in information from private sources, often containing detailed and substantiated claims, mainly in custom-related matters, VAT and e-commerce;
- several allegations concerning breach of sanctions against Russia.

In addition, more contacts were established with EPPO at the selection stage, leading to the opening of a higher number of complementary investigations and enabling the two offices to avoid duplication. Observations made during the selection stage offer a look into the future, which may well develop into trends for formal investigations in years to come.






## Expenditure investigations

Broadly speaking, investigations into wrongdoing against EU expenditure can be broken down into four parts:

- **Direct management** – when funds for projects are disbursed and managed by EU Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies;
- **Shared management** – when funds for projects are managed by a Member State in collaboration with the Commission;
- **RRF** – when funds are implemented directly by the Commission;
- **Internal** - investigations into fraud or serious misconduct committed by any staff member of Members of any EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.

Investigations opened from 2021 to 2025 in shared management



Investigations opened from 2021 to 2025 by investigative area



## Direct management

The number of investigations relating to direct expenditure has increased significantly. The main trends associated with this stream of funding include a significantly higher number of investigations in non-EU countries, raising new challenges.

Moreover, investigations become more complex, involving many projects, often under different funding programmes, and requiring extensive data analysis.

OLAF also observed a significant rise in the number of investigations related to complex procurement irregularities/fraud, including conflict of interest, in both administrative expenditures and grants allocated by EU bodies to national authorities.

Finally, our investigators were involved in numerous cases relating to non-financial matters outside of OLAF's traditional expertise such as technical and scientific issues.

## Shared management

When it comes to shared management, OLAF mainly investigates allegations concerning violations of public procurement rules (primarily manipulation of procedures through tailored technical specifications, designed to favour specific contractors or suppliers), instances of collusion, conflicts of interest, inflated invoices, and false documents.

A trend confirmed in 2025 relates to the increasing difficulties to 'follow the money'. Fraudsters' schemes are becoming more complex, involving the creation of off-shore intermediaries, and banking transactions via new types of financial intermediaries and from different locations across the world.

Large construction projects, such as highways, waste and water treatment plants continued to attract fraudsters in 2025.


Irregularities in the procurement and implementation of IT projects also remain an area of concern in the era of digitalisation.

## RRF and performance-based models

In a reaction to the COVID pandemic, in 2021 the European Commission launched the €648 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The RRF is made up of a mixture of loans and grants for EU national authorities to help drive reforms and stimulate the economy. The Facility is managed under direct management mode by the European Commission.

The RRF also ushered in a new financing mechanism, the so-called performance-based model, which sees the Commission make funds available only if Member States achieve the milestones and targets included in their agreed national plans. Therefore, instead of the Commission reimbursing projects against specific expenses claims, fixed tranches of funding are disbursed if jointly agreed milestones are met. This model will also be the one used in significant parts of the proposed Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-


### Investigations concluded in 2025 in shared management




### Investigations concluded in 2025 by investigative area

2034. The same mechanism is also being used in external funding, such as the Ukraine and Western Balkans facilities.

Trends identified during investigations on RRF projects include cases of serious irregularities, such as violations of the procurement procedures limiting competition and cases of conflict of interest. OLAF also observed that control systems of Member States sometimes do not define sufficiently the baseline for the indicator and cannot ensure cross-checks with previous or parallel national and EU investments. In other instances, the targets initially set by the national plans allow inflation of results via the financing of multiple projects.



**Investigations concluded in 2025 concerning use of EU funds under shared and indirect management or RRF, linked to Member States**



**Investigations concluded in 2025 concerning use of EU funds under shared and indirect management or RRF, linked to third countries**

These tables do not contain data on investigations on EU funds managed directly by EU institutions and bodies. Such investigations may concern economic operators in several Member States or third countries. Although OLAF carries out such investigations often with the support of the national authorities, the complexity of the investigations does not make it possible to attribute them to a specific Member State or third country.

## Internal investigations

EU institutions and bodies must lead by example. Our internal investigations play an essential role in the EU's accountability framework: they help ensure that members and staff of the institutions adhere to the highest standards of professional conduct and financial integrity.

OLAF conducted a series of high-profile investigations in 2025 in this area, often in cooperation with the EPPO. The majority of these cases are still ongoing, therefore no details can be provided in this report.


Last year, OLAF saw a rise of ethics-related investigations. This includes allegations of undeclared external activities and conflicts of interests.

This trend underscores the growing emphasis on safeguarding ethical integrity within the EU institutions. A significant number of these cases concerned entities located outside Brussels, highlighting the need for constant awareness-raising and clarification regarding ethical rules, as well as their implementation and enforcement.

Other trends observed in internal investigations in 2025 include harassment, abuse of teleworking and pension rights, and misuse of mission budgets.

While cases relating to ethical issues in recruitment, such as favouritism, remain under consideration, they have seen a relative decline compared to previous years.

### Investigations into EU staff and members of the institutions concluded in 2025



## Revenue investigations & customs

Protecting the Union's revenues, competitiveness and standards sees OLAF working with partners in the EU and around the world to prevent smuggling, evasion of customs duties and circumvention of sanctions, among others.

In 2025, OLAF noted new trends and schemes that affect certain EU revenue streams or aim to introduce dangerous goods into the EU.



### E-cigarettes

The illicit trade in electronic cigarettes and vapes continued to grow dramatically in 2025. Given the potential market, OLAF has noted a significant surge in the smuggling of these items. These schemes circumvent taxes and avoid inspections aimed to verify that the e-cigarettes comply with EU standards. This last aspect is worrying given the large and growing power of attraction of these products for the younger population.

### Fake exports

Smuggling networks frequently use fraudulent export declarations to evade customs duties, tax obligations, sanctions and safety regulations. This results in unsafe and illicit products entering the markets, price distortion in legitimate markets, and reduced profitability for legal companies. Moreover, jobs are lost in affected sectors and consumers unknowingly purchase unsafe or illicit products.

The high volume of trade in the world, particularly the EU, makes it impossible to check all incoming and outgoing shipments.

In 2025, OLAF saw a worrying surge in the use of the fake exports scheme to introduce in Europe products that are banned, and products that contain substances that are not fit for human consumption or safe use.



### Air-express parcels and warehousing

Another worrying trend concerns the irregular arrival of air-express parcels containing goods that are subject to higher taxes, such as textiles, shoes, handbags and e-bikes, as well as illicit goods, including dangerous, counterfeit and substandard products.

These goods are increasingly shipped in smaller consignments instead of large containers, making suspicious shipments harder to spot. On top of that, each consignment contains a mixture of different goods, making detection and inspection extremely difficult.

Once in the EU these goods are often stored in warehouses with little information about where they came from. They are sold through online sellers that do not clearly indicate the origin of the product and sometimes they end up being traded on the grey market.



This trend is concerning for many reasons. These products may be illicit or unfit/unsafe to use and can be dangerous for consumers. Moreover, they may adversely affect the functioning of critical equipment or infrastructure, endangering safety and security, and could also damage the environment. The other side of the problem is that the arrival of massive quantities of goods that evade taxes and duties undermines Europe's economy and competitiveness, destroying industry and jobs, on top of being a net loss for the taxpayer.

## Cooperation with the EPPO

One welcome trend noted in 2025 was an increase in cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO). The EPPO began operations in 2021 and since then our working relations have been characterised by growing synergies, complementarity and non-duplication, to ensure that all available means are used to protect the Union’s financial interests.

2025 was the year that saw great strides made in operational cooperation. The increasing number of complementary investigations requested by the EPPO attests to the value placed on OLAF’s unique experience and insights.

Cases sent to the EPPO by OLAF in 2025 by investigative area




This trend was noted in all areas, from expenditure to internal investigations and revenue. The EPPO requested the opening of more complementary investigations in the areas of shared management and RRF, especially in complex cases involving schemes where procurement procedures were manipulated or where non-EU countries were involved.

On the revenue side, in 2025 OLAF worked with the EPPO during “Operation Calypso” (see further [“A big fraud at the port”](#)).



# Investigative activities

## Protection of EU funds



### Amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in 2025 (€ million)


Each year the EU disburses hundreds of billions of funds to Member States, non-EU countries, partners and organisations around the world to finance its strategic objectives.

The main spending areas are the European Structural and Investment Funds, research and innovation funds such as Horizon Europe as well as other direct expenditure schemes including the RRF, and external aid. These funds finance European political priorities aiming at creating a stronger, smarter, more competitive and resilient Europe. They are also intended to improve citizens' lives by supporting key sectors such as agriculture, education, research & innovation, environment, and industry.

OLAF's mandate is to detect, investigate and prevent any potential fraud, irregularity or other wrongdoing against these funds and the EU budget in general. In other words, we make sure that EU taxpayers' money reaches the priority funding areas where it is intended and where it does good.

In terms of EU expenditure, in 2025 OLAF recommended to recover €597 million and prevented €18 million from being lost to fraud and irregularities.

### Investigations concluded in 2025 in shared management



### Investigations concluded in 2025 by investigative area



## Direct management

When EU funding is managed directly by an EU body it is known as direct management. This means that the EU body in question is directly responsible for all steps, including launching the calls for proposals, evaluating submitted proposals, signing grant agreements, contracts or other legal commitments, monitoring project implementation, assessing the results and making payments. The Commission currently manages a small part of the funds under direct management. They are managed mostly by the EU agencies and bodies that are separated legal entities. Some of the funds are managed by other institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Court of Auditors, the European Council, and the European External Action Service.

Whenever funding is available, fraudsters often try to steal a piece for themselves. 2025 was no exception and the number of investigations in direct expenditure increased significantly. All indications suggest that this trend will continue.

## International investigations

OLAF follows EU funds wherever they go in the world. This has seen the Office investigate in every inhabited continent, showing that no part of the globe is immune from fraud. Following the money in this way allowed us to observe an increase in the number of investigations in non-EU countries.

## “Unclose the circle”

The European Union’s programme Horizon Europe is designed to foster innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness by funding research and development projects worldwide. This objective is undermined when beneficiaries fail to properly implement the projects, putting the integrity of the programme at risk.

OLAF investigated two linked companies in Norway that had received funding for several research projects in the field of circular economy under the Horizon Europe programme. OLAF found that both companies lacked the financial and operational capacity to carry out the projects, despite having claimed over €2.9 million in EU funding.

The financial statements of the two companies indicated a weak financial capacity, while their limited assets and resources revealed a lack of adequate operational capacity needed to carry out the projects. During OLAF’s on-the-spot checks, the companies failed to provide sufficient information and documentation to support their activities and were found not to maintain adequate records, which prevented OLAF from verifying whether project-related costs were actually incurred. This resulted in ineligible costs, including personnel costs, that were not backed by appropriate documentation.


As a result, OLAF recommended, among other measures, the recovery of the full amount of the funding received, totalling more than **€2.2 million**. Around **€700 000 of funding was prevented from being unduly spent**.

### Recommended action


Responsible authorising officers must ensure that beneficiaries have the necessary financial robustness and operational capacity before and throughout the implementation of EU-funded projects.







**Investigations concluded in 2025 concerning use of EU funds under shared and indirect management or RRF, linked to Member States**



**Investigations concluded in 2025 concerning use of EU funds under shared and indirect management or RRF, linked to third countries**

These tables do not contain data on investigations on EU funds managed directly by EU institutions and bodies. Such investigations may concern economic operators in several Member States or third countries. Although OLAF carries out such investigations often with the support of the national authorities, the complexity of the investigations does not make it possible to attribute them to a specific Member State or third country.



## Shared management

Under shared management the Commission and the national authorities of the country concerned jointly manage a particular programme. Around 70% of EU programmes and policies are run under the banner of shared management. One example being the common agricultural policy (CAP).

### “EU funds [almost] gone with the wind”

OLAF uncovered a group of companies in Hungary working together to illegally obtain European Regional Development Funds via numerous projects aimed at supplying heavy machinery to companies in rural areas to boost their competitiveness.

The companies created an international paper trail. In reality, however, the funds were not transferred directly or at all to the suppliers, but instead to intermediaries taking high fees without adding any value.

The investigation uncovered instances of manipulated procurement processes, including falsified bidding documents, inflated prices for machinery, double funding, and innovative techniques potentially indicative of money laundering. Both the beneficiaries and suppliers exploited the banking system to make transactions appear compliant with supply contracts, while payments were directed to bank accounts owned by other individuals. In some cases, additional intermediaries were employed to further prevent traceability.

As a result, OLAF issued administrative, financial and judicial recommendations and recommended the recovery of almost **€1.5 million** of funds unduly spent.

This case highlights the inherent complexities of fraud involving money laundering, showing the lengths launderers will go to, to hide their tracks. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) is a newly instituted agency of the European Union, established in 2024. Its principal function is to harmonise efforts among national authorities, ensuring the uniform implementation of EU regulations concerning anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. The agency's chief objectives are to safeguard EU citizens and the financial system against unlawful money flows and terrorist financing.

### “Gridlock!”

OLAF closed an investigation into an infrastructure project co-financed under the European Regional Development Fund for the completion of motorway works, for approximately €25.6 million.

The investigation started following an enquiry by the Italian Anti-corruption Authority. Criminal proceedings led to the conviction of subjects connected to the beneficiary, for serious crimes including corruption and abuse of office.

The works in question had been gridlocked for years with little progress being made. OLAF's investigation identified several reasons for these delays and interruptions, including a financial crisis affecting the contractor, several disputes with subcontractors and commercial partners, a plethora of civil and administrative proceedings, mismanagement and violations of public procurement rules by the beneficiary. The investigation also uncovered an attempt to automatically extend the deadline of the contract which was in breach of the relevant legislation.

OLAF unearthed a series of actions that cast significant doubts on the contractor's conduct, particularly concerning conflicts of interest. It appeared that the contractor had entered into a consultancy contract with a company, intended for legal and technical assistance, which had been approved by the beneficiary as a subcontracting agreement. This contravened the rules governing such projects. Moreover, OLAF discovered that the president of the beneficiary entity was concurrently providing services to the very same subcontractor.

These events prevented the works from being implemented thoroughly and on time, violated many rules on sound financial management, causing a substantial waste of public money and thereby jeopardising the financial interests of the EU.

As a result, OLAF issued financial recommendations to the relevant Commission department, to ensure the recovery of approximately **€25.6 million**. Judicial recommendations were also addressed to the national Court of Auditors, in order to initiate a procedure for damage to the State revenues.

### Recommended action

To better protect EU's and Member States' public funds against fraud and associated money laundering, OLAF supports the strengthening of cooperation with AMLA and the Member States' Financial Intelligence Units. OLAF also urges that the new Anti-Money Laundering Directive be transposed as soon as possible by all Member States.



## RRF and performance-based models

Each year the Commission disburses billions via the RRF, and these funds obviously attract fraudsters. Despite the many positives associated with this form of funding, it is not immune to fraud and wrongdoing. OLAF investigated 18 cases linked to the RRF in 2025.

### “Rigging the system”

OLAF received allegations concerning potential irregularities in the award of a contract by an entity in Spain, intended to provide training to staff in the framework of a RRF project.

According to the allegations, the tender specifications seemed tailor-made to one particular tenderer, which subsequently won the training contract. The investigation established that the technical specifications were drafted in a way that mirrored key characteristics of the services and products provided by the specific economic operator.

OLAF concluded that the tailored specifications gave an undue competitive advantage to that contractor and breached the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of tenderers. Following the investigation, OLAF recommended to recover **€266 000**.

### **Recommended action**

Experience shows that to gain better oversight of wrongdoings in future performance-based funding models, it would be beneficial to build additional protection measures into the new MFF proposals. Key additional elements would be mandatory reporting of fraud and irregularities to the Commission and extending the Commission’s powers to recover affected funds, including in case of irregularities.

### “Inflated results and unclear indicators”

One trend particular to performance-based funding is the phenomenon of inflated results. This happens when the targets initially set by the National Recovery and Resilience Plans include projects where instances of fraud or other illegal activities are identified. These projects are then replaced by projects not affected by these problems in order to ensure that the targets set by the national plan are nevertheless achieved.

OLAF also identified cases where Member States’ control systems did not define sufficiently the baseline for the indicator and could not ensure cross-checks with previous or parallel national and EU investments into the same indicators. This made impossible to establish with certainty whether the target was met.



## “Clouding the data”

In 2025, OLAF closed an investigation into irregularities in the implementation of several RRF financed contracts, aiming to connect a number of buildings in Sweden to a high-speed broadband network. The RRF is a performance-based instrument, meaning that to receive the payment, Member States must reach a given number of milestones, composed by targets referring to measurable indicators, within a given deadline. The investigation revealed that some buildings were initially counted as part of the overall project target, despite already being connected to the grid via previous investments. OLAF also identified weaknesses in the management and control systems. For example, the authority in charge of implementing the projects lacked a reliable database that would identify which buildings were already part of the broadband network. Instead, they relied on the providers' own data to determine which buildings were connected. It was therefore impossible to measure how many buildings were newly connected as a result of the RRF investment. The lack of a consolidated national database containing information on EU funded projects (RRF and non-RRF) did not allow to exclude the possibility of double funding. OLAF estimated that the potential impact of these weaknesses on the EU investment was worth **€46.4 million**.



## Excessive milestone modification

The RRF Regulation and the operational agreements between the European Commission and the Member States only set the periodical instalments (five to eight, depending on the dimension of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan). Modifications of the milestone can take place through a formal adaptation of the Council implementing decision. Based on this procedure, Member States can therefore, under specific conditions, decide where to allocate the funds and how much to allocate per single milestone and target. Member States also decide what milestones to submit to the European Commission for assessment and payment and when. For the sake of flexibility, milestones and targets can be recalibrated. This is an important tool which may help projects adapt to changing circumstances and avoid losing funding. However, the excessive modifications of timelines and targets can hamper OLAF's ability to assess the progress made. For example, the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan has been modified seven times, with each modification affecting dozens of milestones and targets. As a consequence of a modification, an ongoing audit or investigation could risk being compromised.



## Stricter rules for financial corrections

In the context of RRF, OLAF can only conduct administrative investigations for the purpose of fighting fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. In case of inflated outputs, however, uncovering individual cases of fraud within the same measure does not affect the achievement of the milestone or target. This means that the payment will be made in full (as the RRF is a performance-based instrument, individual cases of fraud may not affect the overall performance).

However, this does not affect the Member States' obligation to take all appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union and to ensure that the use of funds complies with the applicable EU and national law, in particular regarding prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption and conflicts of interests<sup>2</sup>.

OLAF can also assess the milestones and targets submitted by Member States and if the milestone/target is not met, the instalment is 'suspended'. Finally, OLAF can evaluate the effectiveness of the national control system and if a 'deficiency' is identified a flat-rate correction of 5%-10%-25%-100% can be applied.

OLAF could still issue a financial recommendation for a correction to the competent department of the European Commission 'to reduce proportionately the support under the Facility and recover any amount due to the Union budget', but stricter rules apply. This procedure, quite usual under the structural funds, has never been applied under the RRF.

### Recommended action

Implement a standardised set of performance indicators applicable to all EU budget programmes including output and result indicators allowing clear baseline and target measurement (see [Commission proposal](#) for a Regulation establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities).

Propose application of financial corrections for single or (systemic) irregularities in case of inflated results.

Recalibrate the allowed modifications of National Resilience and Recovery Plans and possibly set stricter limits to the number of modifications that can be made to national plans.

### *“An irregular tender procedure”*

OLAF opened an investigation into alleged irregularities related to an IT procurement procedure managed by an EU agency and the possible misconduct by EU staff members for a total estimated value of more than €40 million. The case was reported to the EPPO and reclassified as a complementary investigation.

OLAF established that the Operational Verification Officer and the Responsible Authorising Officer had breached the principle of sound financial management and prevented proper competition in the tendering process by failing to ensure transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination, thereby harming the financial interests of the Union.

OLAF recommended opening a disciplinary procedure against the involved EU staff members and concluded that the framework contract and the corresponding specific contracts signed following this tender procedure were irregular and that consequently the corresponding payments were ineligible.

The financial impact of the facts established is **€7.5 million**.

<sup>2</sup> Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility.




# Internal investigations

OLAF is mandated to investigate serious misconduct in the discharge of professional duties committed by any staff member or Member of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.

These internal investigations are conducted in full independence holding those who work for the EU to account, no matter their status.

In 2025, OLAF's investigations focussed increasingly on complex and sensitive cases. Several of those are ongoing and involved high-ranking officials that could cause reputational damage to the EU.

## Investigations into EU staff and members of the institutions concluded in 2025



## Conflict of interest

One rising trend in recent years relates to ethical concerns. This includes allegations of undeclared external activities, when a staff member carries out paid work that they are not entitled to do or they do not declare. These activities are investigated because such behaviour can result in accusations of conflict of interest, as well as lack of transparency and breach of the principle of objectivity and impartiality. Investigations into potential conflicts of interests rose steadily in 2025.

### *“Nice work if you can get it!”*

OLAF investigated allegations involving the Head of an EU body in the area of education and training and established that the person in question was in charge of signing off the EU body’s financing of training activities. However, at the same time the same person was officially represented in an association that provides such training programmes. The investigation revealed that this association had been paid to provide training to the same EU body. Furthermore, it emerged that the person concerned participated in a procedure that resulted in the said association officially joining the EU network of entities that could organise training programmes. This network is financed by the EU body where the person concerned held a senior role.

OLAF concluded that the individual had breached EU rules on conflicts of interest and external activities and recommended the competent EU body to **initiate proceedings of disciplinary nature**.

### *“Not so sickly deception”*

OLAF conducted a complementary investigation with the EPPO into allegations concerning potentially forged medical invoices submitted in support of reimbursement requests by an EU staff member. The Office in charge of reimbursing medical expenses became suspicious following the sudden increase in the number of reimbursement requests over a short period of time, the nature of the medical expenses, and their cumulative nature.

In close cooperation with the EPPO, OLAF analysed several hundreds of medical invoices and conducted on-the-spot checks at the premises of healthcare facilities. During this investigation, the support of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) of Hungary (where the healthcare facilities were located) was pivotal in the smooth planning and conduct of operations on the spot as well as the collection of administrative data and access to bank transactions’ records.

The investigation established that the staff member was unknown to most healthcare facilities and that **over 95% of the invoices submitted had been forged**. OLAF concluded that the person had acted in breach of Staff Regulations and sickness insurance rules.

The information collected by OLAF was crucial to the EPPO in their investigation. In particular, information gleaned from the analysis of invoices that was then used during the interviews. The case ended with the person admitting the facts and confessing to the fraud. **Disciplinary recommendations were issued**, and the staff member reimbursed the corresponding amounts before the end of the investigation.



# Revenue investigations & customs

OLAF's work in the area of customs fraud and illicit trade of goods safeguards duties and taxes that finance the EU budget. Doing so protects the competitiveness of our economy and our jobs. We also safeguard our health, our safety, and our environment from the attacks of opportunistic fraudsters and organised crime seeking to make easy money.

To do this work, OLAF teams up with partners in the EU and around the world, in a large, complex network that includes customs authorities, police authorities, judicial authorities, tax authorities, etc. Other players are also involved at national level, such as market surveillance authorities, environmental agencies, intellectual property bodies, industry and consumer associations.

Technological progress and world trade bring great benefits to our economies, but they are frequently abused by fraudsters and organised crime. Cross-border in nature, fast-changing and opportunistic, customs fraud and illicit traffics are more rampant than ever.


## Tobacco and e-cigarettes

One of OLAF's staple roles is supporting the fight against the illicit trade in tobacco. In 2025, OLAF continued to support Member States by gathering information from non-EU countries, monitoring suspicious consignments, and coordinating investigations. Our activities in this field led to seizures of just over **427 million illicit cigarettes worldwide**, with **219 million cigarettes confiscated** at the EU's external borders.


OLAF also helped seize **411 kilos of raw tobacco**, and **53.6 kilos of water pipe tobacco**. OLAF's work in this area prevented the loss of over **€178 million** to the EU and national budgets.

The illicit trade of electronic cigarettes and vapes has been increasing in recent years. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 100 million people use such products. Europe has the highest consumption, and the estimation is that e-cigarettes are used by 4.6 % of adults and 14.6 % of 13–15-year-olds.

Unsurprisingly, given the potential market, OLAF has seen a vast increase in smuggling of these items. Beyond the health and safety aspect, this illicit trade raises many issues, not least environmental ones, as e-cigarettes are disposable and an uncontrolled trade leads to an increase in wastend an uncontrolled trade leads to an increase in waste.







## E-cigarettes

Most e-cigarettes seized in the EU are produced legally in China and are subsequently smuggled into the EU. E-cigarettes chargers, accessories and devices reach the EU in big consignments shipped on sea containers, air freight or fragmented in small parcels.

The e-cigarettes may be destined to private individuals who resell them on the black market. They may also be sold to shell companies (or to companies whose identity is abused) and directed to warehouses to be sold on the black market.

Another trend is the declaration of the e-cigarettes as entering the EU in transit towards a final destination outside the EU. However, during the ‘transit’ the e-cigarettes are replaced with other goods meaning that the e-cigarettes never actually leave the EU and are sold on the black market instead. They can also leave the EU and be sold on the black market in non-EU countries where their sale is prohibited. Finally, liquids and/or other parts of e-cigarettes may be imported by EU-based companies and used in illicit factories to produce counterfeit e-cigarettes to sell on the black market.

The illegal trade in e-cigarettes is truly a global business. Therefore, a global effort is needed to tackle it.

The fragmented regulatory landscape across the EU poses a particular challenge to combating the illicit trade of e-cigarettes. While the [European Tobacco Products Directive](#) sets common minimum requirements — such as limiting nicotine content to a maximum of 20 mg/ml, restricting refill containers to no more than 10 ml, and capping cartridge or tank capacity at 2 ml — Member States may adopt stricter limits in their national legislations. Many other aspects remain entirely within national competence, resulting in significant regulatory differences among Member States.

Some Member States ban disposable e-cigarettes while most still allow them; other Member States impose different thresholds on nicotine concentration or cartridge size; some Member States prohibit cross-border distance sales or flavoured products, while others do not. This lack of a common approach across the EU offers fraudsters a competitive advantage.

### JCO “VAPE”

In October 2025, OLAF launched the Joint Customs Operation (JCO) “VAPE”, targeting the illicit traffic of e-cigarettes and bringing together 25 EU customs authorities as well as customs authorities from Australia, China (mainland and Hong Kong), Egypt, Norway, Philippines, Türkiye, and Ukraine. The results of the operation confirmed that the e-cigarettes entering the EU and other markets around the world are legally produced in and exported from the country of origin.

The illegality starts when the e-cigarettes are deliberately mis-declared at import. Instead of being labelled truthfully, they are declared as other goods, such as towels, outdoor storage, pillows, paper cups, monitors, plastic blocks, furniture, clothing, shoes and headphones, toys, etc. This mis-declaration often happens to evade customs controls. The e-cigarettes are then stored in warehouses in the EU and illegally sold across Europe, in some cases via illegal e-commerce stores.

Many of the e-cigarettes seized in the EU were not compliant with EU legislation as they contained more than 20 mg of nicotine, and the refill cartridges were sometimes bigger than allowed under EU standards.

Special vapes, such as combined vapes, were also seized. These vapes have special features (for example, ear plugs that allow to listen to music). These elements make them even more attractive and represent a higher health risk, especially for young users.

### **Recommended action**

A coordinated EU approach to the regulation of e-cigarettes would contribute to reducing some of the difficulties faced by the enforcement authorities in Europe.





# Illicit trade of dangerous, substandard and counterfeit goods

## Refrigerant gases

In 2025, OLAF continued to investigate the smuggling into the EU of refrigerant gases originating in Asia. Smugglers claim that the gases they are handling are only transiting through Europe, but in fact those ‘re-export’ claims are false. OLAF works closely with national and international authorities to detect, analyse and pass on tracking information and intelligence on suspicious shipments and operators. It is suspected that more than 150 fictitious ‘re-export’ declarations have been recorded in several Member States.



## “NOXIA II”

In 2025, OLAF led the second edition of Joint Customs Operation NOXIA, delivering major results against the illicit trade of dangerous substances.

JCO NOXIA is a unique large-scale joint customs operation conducted by the customs administrations of 40 partner countries in Asia and Europe, under the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), with the support of the World Customs Organization (WCO).

Operation NOXIA II targeted shipments suspected of containing illicit cigarettes, waste, drug precursors, and pesticides. In this operation, participants exchange real-time information on suspicious shipments of the dangerous goods selected and place them under surveillance to detect and seize the illicit goods.

The operation led to the seizure of almost 150 million cigarettes, over 3,000 tonnes of illicit waste, 66.5 kilos of drug precursor pseudoephedrine (a key component of methamphetamine), 52 tonnes of solid pesticides, and 21,000 litres of liquid pesticides.

Another key objective of Operation NOXIA is to exchange information about fraud schemes, routes and emerging trends, and to build a collaborative network of customs officers working together all year round to tackle the challenges posed by global illicit trafficking of dangerous substances.

## Counterfeit pesticides

OLAF played a key role in the uncovering of a massive underground illicit pesticide production system in Ukraine. A criminal network engaged in the mass production and counterfeiting of agrochemical products, mainly pesticides, that were falsely labelled as products of some of the leading agrochemical brands in Europe and the USA. The Ukrainian authorities conducted 89 searches that led to the seizure of hundreds of tons of illicit products worth over €2.3 million.

OLAF’s intelligence was at the heart of this operation, as well as the cross-border coordination that led to the setting up of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) between Romania, Ukraine and OLAF under the umbrella of EUROJUST. What at the start looked like isolated seizures in [Bulgaria](#) and [Romania](#) turned out to be the tip of the iceberg of a much bigger scheme operated from Ukraine, that was damaging legitimate businesses, farmers, consumers and the environment.

## Waste

Illegal shipments of waste pose a serious risk to public health, legitimate businesses, and global security. Hazardous or improperly managed waste can contaminate soil, water, air, as well as our food chain.

In 2025, OLAF supported the Albanian authorities in stopping the illegal export to Thailand of hazardous industrial waste from the port of Durrës. OLAF alerted the Albanian customs authorities about a shipment suspected of containing large quantities (102 containers) of mis-declared hazardous waste. Export documents described the cargo as iron oxide, which is not toxic, but laboratory analysis later established that it was a toxic by-product of steel production containing high concentrations of heavy metals.

OLAF organised and participated in several operational meetings with the Albanian investigators and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The operation ended with Thai authorities returning the shipment to Albania, and the issuing of **33 arrest warrants**.

## Protecting Europe’s budget, competitiveness, security, health and safety

### Sophisticated trade diversion schemes

In order to detect ever changing, sophisticated and cross-border fraud schemes, OLAF conducts investigations based on advanced analytical monitoring of trade and customs data and facilitates the exchange of information and administrative verifications between customs authorities of Member States and non-EU countries. These investigations aim to protect the financial interests of the EU against the evasion of import duties and VAT at import and help protect the competitiveness of its industry against unfair practices. In 2025, OLAF observed cases of trade diversion of e-bikes, which are subject to strict trade defence measures.

The rules of origin for these goods are complex. Producers relocate to another country so that they can claim that the goods originate from that country to avoid paying antidumping duties.


Sophisticated trade diversion techniques are often employed by fraudsters, with goods routed via factories in suitable countries of origin (i.e. countries that are not subject to EU antidumping duties) where the goods undergo minimal transformation.

The same scheme is used to circumvent the application of import quotas in strategic sectors, such as steel. OLAF has also investigated fraud schemes on aluminium, pipes, silicon, coat paper, fasteners, fuels, plywood, chemicals or thermal paper. Some of these commodities are crucial for security and defence.

By investigating these cases OLAF contributes to safeguarding strategic industries, reducing critical dependencies, improving the resilience of supply chains, and protecting sensitive technologies.

### “Putting the brakes on e-bike fraud”

Another OLAF investigation in 2025 focused on e-bikes exported from Indonesia to the EU. Working with the authorities of Indonesia, OLAF analysed key components of a shipment of e-bikes at the premises of the exporters and ascertained that most of the components in reality originated in China and had only been processed in Indonesia. Therefore, the e-bikes could not be labelled as coming from Indonesia but had to be considered of Chinese origin. As a result, they could not be exported to the EU. This investigation prevented the evasion of **€7.2 million** EU import duties.



### “Steely determination pays off”

OLAF closed an investigation on the evasion of safeguard measures imposed on imports of stainless-steel bars and light sections. These are goods typically used in the construction and automotive industry. Due to their strength, outdoor suitability and resistance to corrosion, they are suitable for military use as a raw material for weapons, armour frame, tanks, submarines or for the aerospace industry.

The EU imposes quotas to protect the industry against global overcapacity and to ensure long-term autonomy, with an emphasis on quality and greening.

OLAF carried out an investigation with Swiss and Liechtenstein authorities that identified a trade diversion resulting in the evasion of €5 million in import duties. Verifications at the premises of the exporters revealed that they were abusing Liechtenstein’s steel export quota. The steel in question came from a different country and therefore was liable to import duties. However, the wrongful rebranding of the steel as Liechtenstein steel allowed it to be exempt from these duties. The fraud resulted in the evasion of **€5.2 million** of import duties.

### **Recommended action**

A good way to prevent and intercept trade diversion schemes is to secure strong anti-fraud clauses in Free Trade Agreements with third countries. Administrative verification of the production records and supply chain of the exporting companies doing minimal transformation is crucial to ensure the correct application of trade defence measures. It is of particular importance to ensure reciprocity in the cooperation with non-EU countries through strong anti-fraud clauses in all Free Trade Agreements.





## Fake exports

Global supply chains are designed to facilitate efficient trade, but their complexity, scale, and cross-border nature can create vulnerabilities. Fraudsters may leverage legitimate transport routes, warehousing systems, and documentation processes to conceal illegal shipments. The high volume of trade in the world and in particular the EU, makes it impossible to check all the incoming and outgoing shipments.

Once logistics infrastructure is established (transport routes, warehouses, shipping networks, customs channels, intermediaries etc), it can be exploited to move illicit goods towards and within the EU.

Export fraud presents significant enforcement challenges for EU authorities due to its sophisticated and multi-dimensional nature. Complex supply chains rely on multiple intermediaries and fraudulent networks operate across multiple Member States and outside the EU. They exploit differences in legal systems and rely on sophisticated fraud networks. Moreover, they can benefit from limited real-time data sharing, resource constraints and insufficient technical capacity of EU authorities.

The goods most frequently intercepted before they made their way to the EU market through fake exports are cigarettes, drug precursors for the illegal production of amphetamines, illicit medicines and fake spare car parts. Fake exports function like a Trojan horse. These invisible and hard to detect schemes call for a new way of working on antifraud matters that is more attentive to what leaves the EU, not just what arrives. For that reason, OLAF is finetuning its capacity to deliver early alerts to the EU Customs authorities so that they can effectively target suspicious situations.

For example, OLAF intercepted a consignment of water pipe tobacco (shisha) that was shipped via airfreight from the United Arab Emirates to Türkiye. The consignment then went from Türkiye to Romania and from there it was intended for export to Venezuela from a port in France where it should have arrived by lorry from Romania. The shipment was returned to the United Arab Emirates. In total, we have identified 13 consignments with the same pattern that previously managed to go through. To make the scheme more credible, all the companies mentioned in the paperwork were existing companies, not shell companies.


**Import duties evaded** recommended to be recovered to customs authorities of EU Member States corresponds to the amount of evaded VAT payments identified by OLAF. We advised Member States' authorities to recover these amounts, thereby increasing a country's general wealth and protecting the EU's budget

**VAT fraud at import established** in OLAF customs fraud investigations corresponds to the amounts lost due to VAT scams at the import level such as undervaluation fraud

**Precautionary measures** sent to customs authorities of EU Member States refers to the amounts recovered by the Member States after being alerted by OLAF

**Amounts prevented from being evaded** as a result of OLAF investigative activities shows the amount that OLAF actions in tackling VAT fraud have had on deterring others from carrying out similar schemes. For example, by helping shut down a factory supplying the EU with illicit and untaxed goods, we ensure that fewer illicit goods are introduced in Europe

### Financial results from OLAF's customs investigations in 2025





## Introduction of goods through warehousing

Another trend that became apparent in 2025 was the sharp increase in large-scale smuggling of goods into the EU, aimed at evading import duties and VAT. In the past, this type of fraud was carried out via sea container traffic, and this remains a problem. However, a new and even more significant challenge is emerging that is the fragmented arrival of goods by air-express parcels.

Goods with high tax implications, such as textiles, shoes, handbags, and e-bikes, along with illicit items like e-cigarettes and medicines are particularly attractive for illicit trade. The same applies to various consumer goods that must adhere to specific standards for consumption and use within the EU. All these items are appealing because they offer substantial profits with relatively low risk of detection. Effective enforcement requires exceptional cooperation between administrative and law enforcement agencies across multiple jurisdictions, both within the EU and internationally.

In 2025, OLAF was very busy joining the dots of these schemes and creating the conditions to enable its numerous partners to take action to combat them.


Of the many cases that OLAF investigate in this area, the hardest to detect are those involving the storage of goods with limited information on their provenance in warehouses, or, for smaller goods, apartments, making them extremely difficult to locate. These goods are dispatched from these warehouses directly to consumers in the EU via online sellers that are not transparent about the origin of the goods they sell.

Furthermore, the sale of goods through unofficial or unregulated platforms on the grey market presents a significant challenge. Fraudsters exploit e-commerce systems designed for low-value goods, which enable them to dispatch air-freight parcels purportedly addressed to individual consumers using simplified declarations. This tactic is used to send high-value taxable items or illegal goods, while falsely declaring the contents of the parcels, which are never actually delivered to the listed recipients.

These schemes are cross-border in nature. OLAF detects them by applying advanced analytical tools to the data available, collecting information from logistic operators and facilitating the cross-border exchange of relevant information between customs and tax authorities, including the authorities of non-EU countries.

On top of these administrative investigative tools, which are agile and effective at protecting the EU budget and at blocking the goods upon arrival, in 2025 OLAF also enhanced its cooperation with the [Eurofisc network](#) and the tax authorities of EU Member States, enabling a more effective prevention, detection and investigation of these schemes.

These patterns need to be continuously monitored so that when the fraud is identified and discontinued at one entry point, there is no diversion to other points. This result requires empowering prosecution, so that the individuals that are responsible for organising these fraud schemes face justice and are prevented from duplicating or adapting their schemes.



### “A big fraud at the port”

In one major case in 2025 OLAF identified an import fraud of e-bikes at the Piraeus Port in Athens.

OLAF concluded its investigation into the irregular import of about 865,000 e-bikes that were misclassified as coming from another country thus avoiding paying correct import duties.

Our investigators detected this deception by tracing the distribution chain, including e-commerce channels, collecting and comparing documents from declarants, logistic actors, customs authorities and other sources. Doing this, allowed us to demonstrate that **€322 million** of import duties and **€171 million** of VAT had been evaded. As OLAF saw the early signs of a possible large fraud scheme managed by an organised criminal network, it reported the case to the EPPO. From then on, OLAF worked in complementarity with the EPPO operation code-named Calypso.

### The future is unknown

Fraudsters react and adapt quickly when situations change. They abandon goods on the way if they can get in trouble, they reconfigure their logistics, while every event or situation that may be happening in the world, from sport to war, is an opportunity for them to make money.

As this report is being printed, OLAF is noticing that air-freight consignments are shapeshifting to go undetected and to make controls impossible. Dealing with that alone is going to be a big challenge in the future. At a time when one of the major world trade routes risks being severely disrupted by war, we will also have to be attentive to how logistics will adapt and evolve.

### **Recommended action**

The EU is reforming its customs union to make procedures more efficient, strengthen security measures and improve risk management across Member States with the setting up of the EU Customs Data Hub for declarative data.

It is of paramount importance that OLAF be given full access to the Data Hub when it goes live. Access to this data will allow OLAF to detect possible fraud signals. It will also improve OLAF's detection and prevention work, safeguarding the financial interest of the EU, and protecting European competitiveness.





## Sanctions



In order to weaken the Russian war machine and stop its illegal and unjustified attack on Ukraine, the EU implemented a series of sanctions packages. These measures include the prohibition to export vehicles from the EU to Russia. OLAF assists Member States in enforcing these sanctions.

In 2025, with the assistance of national authorities, OLAF coordinated a complex cross-border investigation into the suspected circumvention of sanctions, involving the export of over 760 transport vehicles.

The investigation was launched following information provided by the Polish authorities, which identified suspicious exports of used vehicles from several EU Member States. Although the vehicles were declared as destined for Türkiye, evidence gathered by Polish customs suggested that their actual destination was Russia.

Through extensive data analysis and cross-checking of customs, trade, and transport information, OLAF uncovered a broader scheme involving multiple exporters in the EU and declared importers in non-EU countries, including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. Cooperation with the authorities of those countries enabled OLAF to establish that a total of **766 vehicles** had never been imported into the declared destinations.

By tracking each vehicle individually, OLAF reconstructed the logistics chain and ultimately located the vehicles in Russia, confirming the suspected circumvention of EU sanctions. Our findings led to criminal investigations in three different Member States. In addition, information shared by OLAF prompted the corresponding EU authorities to strengthen monitoring and risk profiling of future shipments.







# Impact of investigations

When OLAF concludes an investigation, it may issue recommendations to the competent EU and/or national authorities, inviting them to take action to redress the potential fraud or irregularities uncovered. OLAF's recommendations are intended to protect the EU budget and to uphold the Rule of Law. More specifically:

- **Financial recommendations** invite competent EU or national authorities to recover amounts that were spent in a fraudulent or irregular way, or to prevent them from being unduly spent. In revenue, recommendations invite Member States to collect funds (or to prevent losing funds), not duly collected for the EU budget as a result of fraud or irregularities (VAT or import, for example). In 2025, OLAF issued 141 financial recommendations.
- **Judicial recommendations** encourage Member States' judicial authorities to consider initiating criminal proceedings or to take into account OLAF's findings in their already ongoing investigation. In 2025, OLAF issued 11 judicial recommendations.
- **Disciplinary recommendations** aim to sanction serious misconduct by EU staff or members of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies. In 2025, OLAF issued 18 disciplinary recommendations.
- **Administrative recommendations** try to introduce administrative measures different than, or going beyond, financial or disciplinary action. Such recommendations can suggest a specific administrative action, such as excluding an entity from future EU funding or to perform an audit or an administrative check. Administrative recommendations can also address systemic weaknesses uncovered in management and control systems. In 2025, OLAF issued 46 administrative recommendations.




# Financial recommendations




In the last decade (2016-2025), OLAF recommended to recover €8.3 billion and to prevent €873 million from undue spending. To date, these recommendations have led to €6.8 billion of funds returned to the EU budget (€5.9 billion recovered and € 0.9 billion prevented).

Due to the length of recovery procedures (especially if linked to court proceedings), these amounts will rise over the coming years. On average, 55% of OLAF financial recommendations are still in the process of being implemented five years after the issue date. This share drops to 45% after seven years and to 32% after 10 years.

Differences between the amounts actually protected and the OLAF-recommended amounts are unavoidable for reasons such as court proceedings, agreed settlements, bankruptcies, or cost-effectiveness concerns, such as when recovery costs exceed recommended amounts. Furthermore, additional checks and verifications can uncover new information affecting the final recovery decision, leading to additional protected amounts, for instance if additional audits are carried out with a larger scope than the initial investigation. Recipients might also factor in non-financial considerations, like how well a project meets its funding goals, which is particularly relevant in projects financed under indirect management in less developed countries, where sanctions might jeopardise future projects due to a limited number of adequate service providers.



Financial recommendations by OLAF between 2021 and 2025




### Amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery 2021-2025 (€ million)

Procedures to implement OLAF's financial recommendations vary based on the budget area, but include three key steps:


- OLAF issues financial recommendation for either recovering irregular EU expenditure or for collecting EU revenues,
- recipients decide on the implementation of the recommendation, and on the amount of EU funds to be protected,
- the decision is implemented (external factors like bankruptcy or flight can lower the amount that is ultimately protected).

For **EU expenditure**, implementation of recommendations depends on how the funds are managed. Recovery procedures in direct management are carried out by the Commission, whereas shared management implies the collaboration with Member States's authorities. In indirect management, recovery procedures rely on collaboration with non-EU countries, international organisations, and other EU or national bodies.

**Revenue recommendations** are processed by national customs authorities and monitored jointly by OLAF and the European Commission by means of OWNRES, an own resources database managed by the European Commission. Depending on the circumstances, evaded customs duties are either collected from an investigated economic operator and channelled to the EU budget or recovered directly from national budgets.



## Impact of OLAF financial recommendations on the EU budget for the period 2016-2025




### OLAF's monitoring activity

OLAF does not have enforcement powers over its recommendations but monitors the follow-up by the recipients. We do this by carrying out annual monitoring exercises during which recipients are invited to notify us on their progress in the implementation of financial recommendations previously issued.

The monitoring activity closes the investigation cycle and measures the budgetary impact of OLAF investigations. Furthermore, the information provided by recipients gives a better understanding of the challenges in the implementation process. Accordingly, OLAF's monitoring conclusions lead to improving the overall protection of the EU budget.

This may include:

- issuing additional or revised future recommendations;
- revealing gaps in the regulatory frameworks, which allows modifying the rules to better protect EU's financial interests;
- identifying external factors that influence the implementation process and contributing to strategies to adapt to these circumstances.



In 2025, a ‘Monitoring Forum’ was established to discuss and evaluate how Commission services follow up key OLAF recommendations and EPPO notifications.

This approach is intended to identify recoveries at risk, due to delayed or absent follow-up measures by recipients, and to benefit from lessons learnt from key recommendations and notifications which did not lead to recoveries.


### Recommended action

OLAF welcomes the renewed focus on financial recoveries and on follow-up to its recommendations across the European Commission and beyond. This has the potential to increase uptake of recommendations and speed up the process of recovering EU funds unduly spent.


# Judicial recommendations


OLAF's primary mission is to safeguard the financial interests of the EU through administrative measures. In cases where OLAF detects compelling evidence of a potential criminal offence, it promptly reports this to the EPPO and/or provides judicial recommendations for the relevant Member State authorities to assess the possibility of initiating judicial proceedings. OLAF will continue issuing judicial recommendations to Member States that have not joined the EPPO (Denmark, Hungary, and Ireland) and overseeing the implementation of all judicial recommendations made before the EPPO was established. OLAF welcomes the fact that additional Member States are actively considering accession to the EPPO.

Between 2021 and 2025 OLAF issued 145 judicial recommendations. National judicial authorities took 73 decisions, of which 27 resulted in an indictment.




Judicial recommendations by OLAF between 2021 and 2025





Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF's judicial recommendations between 2021 and 2025





# Disciplinary impact


Disciplinary recommendations issued by OLAF target serious misconduct by EU staff or members of various EU institutions, bodies, or agencies. These recommendations are issued to the appointing authority, which is responsible for enforcing the corresponding disciplinary measures. Although OLAF issues these recommendations, it does not prescribe the specific actions to be undertaken.

In practice, appointing authorities may address a singular OLAF recommendation with several actions or, conversely, consolidate multiple recommendations into a single sanction.


Between 2021 and 2025 OLAF issued 107 disciplinary recommendations. Competent authorities rendered decisions in 65 cases.







Disciplinary recommendations by OLAF between 2021 and 2025



Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF's disciplinary recommendations between 2021 and 2025

# Administrative impact

Administrative recommendations can be categorised into two primary groups:

**Specific recommendations** refer directly to the case under investigation, often involving actions related to the [Early Detection and Exclusion System](#) (EDES) or to other measures, such as further fact-finding activities (additional audits and administrative verifications on particular beneficiaries or financial transactions).



On the other hand, **generic recommendations** extend beyond a specific investigation, addressing systemic deficiencies within the regulatory framework or management and control systems.


Between 2021 and 2025, OLAF issued 271 administrative recommendations.

The European Commission and its executive agencies and bodies emerge as the principal recipient, receiving 254 recommendations, which account for approximately 94% of the total.


The table below shows administrative recommendations by recipient groups and outlines the results of the implementation process. By the close of 2025, decisions have been made by the relevant authorities concerning 147 administrative recommendations issued by OLAF, while 124 remain pending.

Based on the decisions made so far, around 45% of OLAF's administrative recommendations have been either fully or partially implemented.






Administrative recommendations by OLAF between 2021 and 2025



Actions taken by the competent authorities following OLAF's administrative recommendations between 2021 and 2025





# Policy developments

## The review of the Anti-Fraud Architecture

In summer 2025, the European Commission took a significant step forward by adopting a White Paper on the Anti-Fraud Architecture (AFA) Review<sup>3</sup>. The rapidly evolving EU anti-fraud landscape—driven by a shift towards performance-based models for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the introduction of new actors—underscored the urgent need for this review. President von der Leyen and Commissioner for Budget and Anti-Fraud Serafin recognised this urgency, making the AFA review one of Mr Serafin’s first priorities upon assuming his role. Strengthening coordination and synergies among all anti-fraud partners is paramount.

The review aims to establish a thorough and inclusive process, listening to suggestions from all stakeholders on how to increase protection of EU taxpayers' money against fraud and any other types of wrongdoings. The review is both timely and necessary given the rising threats posed by organised crime and fraudsters exploiting technologies such as artificial intelligence and cryptocurrencies.

Since the publication of the White Paper, consultations were carried out and continued into 2026, underlining its wide scope that extends far beyond examining the cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO. The future anti-fraud landscape will be defined by the way that EU anti-fraud actors work with each other and will substantially affect the way OLAF works with partners like Europol, Eurojust, the Anti Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), the Eurofisc network, the future European Customs Authority, national anti-fraud authorities, and the authorising officers of EU Institutions.

The AFA review provides an important opportunity to deepen cooperation in investigations and prosecutions. Areas for potential enhancement include providing more specialised support at European and national levels to the EPPO, thus improving collective ability to share relevant data and to access databases promptly, fostering interoperability among IT systems of anti-fraud entities, and sharing modern technologies. There

is also potential to improve—and ideally automate—the existing hit/no-hit system between the EPPO and OLAF, and to incorporate existing hit/no-hit systems of OLAF and the EPPO with other AFA actors.

Increased efficiency can also be achieved by pooling or sharing investigative resources, not solely in technology but across operations. The ultimate aim is to reclaim greater sums of misused EU money through the investigative and prosecutorial efforts of the various actors. Achieving this requires strengthening synergies between OLAF and the EPPO in administrative and criminal investigations. From the OLAF perspective, the AFA review will include the evaluation – and possible revision – of the Regulation 883.

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) in its report [EU bodies fighting fraud](#) proposes concrete actions to enhance the cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO and to strengthen recoveries to the EU budget. While, most importantly, the report finds that the mandates of OLAF and the EPPO are clear and do not overlap, its three recommendations flag specific areas where improvements are needed.

ECA’s findings highlight the importance of the protection of the EU financial interests, and its recommendations will be instrumental in the context of the AFA review, to ensure an optimised and synergistic functioning of the whole anti-fraud architecture.

OLAF’s key priorities in the AFA review include establishing a more coordinated and enhanced cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO - a genuine twin-track system whereby administrative and criminal investigations runs side-by-side - enabling secure and direct information exchange and making full use of new technologies—such as accessible databases, AI tools, automation, and improved interoperability. The ECA special report may also lead to possible amendment of the respective legal frameworks relating to the EPPO, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust.



<sup>3</sup> COM (2025) 546 final



### **Recommendation 1 - Establish a system for an efficient exchange of information on fraud allegations and investigations**

Against the background of the ongoing review of the EU AFA, the Commission, in collaboration with the EPPO, should establish an interoperable antifraud system, in full compliance with the relevant legal framework, data protection rules and the need for confidentiality in criminal investigations. The system should make it clear where allegations of fraud should be reported and facilitate an efficient exchange of information on fraud allegations and investigations. Within this framework, the new system should be based on the following principles:

### **Recommendation 2 - Analyse the variations in the levels of fraud reported across the EU**

The Commission should analyse the variations in the levels of fraud reported across the EU and take appropriate action by, for example, investigating the causes where significant under-reporting is identified and providing guidance to Member States and EU bodies on reporting practices.

### **Recommendation 3 - Enhance oversight of the follow up of fraud investigations**

To obtain oversight of the extent to which amounts due to the EU budget have been repaid, the Commission should develop a methodology to measure the overall financial impact of the EPPO and OLAF investigations, including repayment to the EU budget following a national court decision resulting from criminal proceedings, in addition to monitoring the follow up of recommendations made as a result of OLAF investigations. This should include requesting regular updates from member states on asset conversion and recovery amounts, and assessing the proportion related to the EU budget.

Anti-fraud actors have already agreed to intensify strategic-level dialogues to identify new trends and exchange best practices. Through this collaboration, we can build a comprehensive understanding of fraud schemes and devise optimal strategies for addressing them.

The AFA review and its evolution are linked to parallel efforts and ongoing holistic policy initiatives at EU level, encompassing the proposal for a Directive combatting corruption, new Regulations against organised crime, the Conditionality Regulation and the monitoring under the Annual Rule of Law Report. Last November, Commissioner Serafin engaged civil society representatives, inviting them to share their perspectives on the AFA review during his 'Implementation and Simplification dialogue'<sup>4</sup>. Their insights will provide novel approaches to bolster collaboration among the AFA actors and thereby enhance the protection of the EU budget.

The AFA review presents an invaluable opportunity for introspection: How can we enhance our capabilities? How can we embrace modernisation? And how can we bolster collaboration? This reflection is set against the broader backdrop of the Commission's Multiannual Financial Framework proposals for 2028-2034. Significantly, OLAF forms part of the Commission's interservice group on the AFA review, which is set to deliver a Communication by the end of 2026, shaping the individual amendments of various legislative acts.

Moreover, the arrival of new leadership at both OLAF and the EPPO is poised to inject fresh impetus into the AFA review process, potentially amplifying its impact.

<sup>4</sup> [https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/events/implementation-dialogue-commissioner-serafin-review-eu-anti-fraud-architecture-2025-11-10\\_en](https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/events/implementation-dialogue-commissioner-serafin-review-eu-anti-fraud-architecture-2025-11-10_en)

# The new Multi Annual Financial Framework

Facing new challenges, the EU needs a budget transformation to remain future-fit. To achieve a free, secure, and competitive Europe, we must rethink our financial approach: a simpler, more flexible, and impactful budget. This involves key reforms and investments tailored for each country, developed with local partners. Establishing a [European Competitiveness Fund](#) will bolster strategic sectors and critical technologies, while revamped financing of external action will align with strategic objectives. Safeguards for the Rule of Law and modernised revenue streams are essential to guarantee sustainable funding for our shared goals.

In this context, the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)<sup>5</sup> is an ambitious overhaul of EU funding, with an unprecedented budget envelope approaching €2 trillion. The European Commission envisions this framework as being simpler, more adaptable, and better attuned to local and regional realities. However, it also represents a transformative shift toward a performance-based model, building on features of the RRF, where Member States receive funds subject to the achievement of specific milestones and targets outlined in their national plans. This marks a decisive move from traditional cost-based to result-based funding.

While the new MFF introduces opportunities, it also poses complex challenges for the EU anti-fraud architecture. On the plus side, the number of spending programmes will be reduced from 52 to 16. Moreover, the new structure is designed to be more flexible, reducing the number of budget headings from seven to four and merging numerous existing programmes into larger, integrated funds to improve efficiency. The streamlined and flexible nature of the programmes will certainly alleviate the administrative burden and focus on internal controls, thus minimising vulnerabilities. Fewer programmes mean fewer implementation rules to navigate, potentially simplifying management, oversight and control.

Integral to fraud prevention, the new MFF aims to support reforms that strengthen the Rule of Law in the Member States and mandates comprehensive reporting on the final beneficiaries of EU funds. This approach, alongside obligatory reporting of any suspected fraud, corruption, irregularities, conflicts of interest, double funding etc. promises to bolster anti-fraud actors to thwart financial misdeeds.

Moreover, the inclusion of national and regional partnership plans aligns EU investments with broader national reform agendas, enhancing management, transparency, and sustainability. However, despite these positive features, the new MFF brings several challenges that must be addressed. Foremost among these is the reliance on the effectiveness of national



control systems for fraud prevention and detection. Experience gained with the RRF highlights inconsistencies in these systems across Member States, raising concerns about their capability to enforce compliance with public procurement mandates, State aid regulations, conflict of interest rules, and anti-fraud measures in programme management. Without stringent enforcement and integration of anti-fraud checks, EU financial interests will remain vulnerable.

Thus, a key priority is to establish a formally structured and operationally robust anti-fraud framework. This requires strong oversight by the Commission and interoperability between national and EU data systems. Mandatory access to comprehensive information on beneficiaries, final recipients, contractors, and contracts is essential for safeguarding financial integrity. Additionally, modernising the budget by tying funds to milestone achievements rather than cost reimbursements may inadvertently incentivise result inflation, misreporting, data manipulation, or premature certification of outcomes. The increased reliance on financial instruments, guarantees, and public-private mechanisms introduces more intermediaries, potentially obscuring financial flows and fragmenting control chains.

The broader EU anti-fraud architecture must evolve to ensure thorough verification of results, access to underlying data, transparency of intermediaries, and clear delineation of investigative and recovery responsibilities.

Together, all AFA actors can harness the promising potential of the new MFF while vigilantly safeguarding against fraud and enhancing the protection of EU financial interests.



<sup>5</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A dynamic EU Budget for the priorities of the future - The Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 (SWD(2025) 570 final - SWD(2025) 571 final).


# The National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS)

While much of this overview on policy developments has focused on EU Institutions, it is imperative to highlight the critical role Member States play in the fight against fraud, as they are on the front line of safeguarding the EU budget.

A key element in this perspective is the National Anti-Fraud Strategy (NAFS). OLAF and the European Commission strongly encourage Member States to adopt these strategies, yet the current EU legal framework does not make them compulsory. As a result, only ten Member States have a dedicated strategy in place, although seven more are actively developing one. Those without NAFS rely on other anti-fraud frameworks or sectoral strategies, which can lead to fragmented efforts.

National strategies play a crucial role in harmonising national and EU anti-fraud initiatives, thus fortifying the overall architecture. They ensure that national actors adopt a unified approach to combating fraud and enhance collaboration at the EU level. With the growing prominence of national plans like the RRF plans and national agricultural plans, the relevance of NAFS continues to rise.

It is therefore important that the Commission's proposal on the MFF includes specific provisions on anti-fraud strategies as a key requirement for management and control systems within future National and Regional Partnership Plans. OLAF is prepared to support Member States by providing guidance and expert advice on developing robust NAFS frameworks. Together, we can ensure that every Member State is equipped with effective strategies to protect the EU budget from fraud.



## Recommended action

OLAF strongly supports the proposal to make National Anti-Fraud Strategies mandatory under the new Multiannual Financial Framework.



# Enlargement

A key response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine was to accelerate the European Union's enlargement agenda; candidate countries and potential candidates have consequently become a focal point also for OLAF in terms of their alignment with financial control standards as recipients of higher overall levels of EU funding.

The Union has pledged approximately €58 billion in the coming years to bolster the transformation efforts of enlargement countries. Also in this policy area, performance-based funding instruments impose greater responsibility on national authorities to protect against misappropriation of EU funds. This model is actively employed in the Facilities for the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova.

Within this broader context, securing the appropriate allocation of EU financial support to Ukraine is a cornerstone of the EU's assistance strategy. Upholding integrity and transparency in the utilisation of these funds is crucial, enhancing both the efficacy of financial aid and the foundational trust that underpins EU-Ukraine relations. This partnership is built upon a resilient framework of accountability and strategic cooperation, ensuring the credibility of EU interventions and bolstering Ukraine's governance reform initiatives.

Ukraine's efforts to maintain a transparent budget and align with EU financial standards are crucial not just for safeguarding EU financial interests but also for securing political support for EU assistance in the long term. OLAF plays a key role by collaborating closely with Ukrainian authorities, providing training, conducting investigations, and ensuring adherence to EU standards. This aids Ukraine's integration into EU structures and strengthens transparency in funds allocation.



# The Union Anti-Fraud Programme (UAFP)

OLAF plays a crucial role in strengthening the EU's fight against fraud by managing the [Union Anti-Fraud Programme](#) (UAFP), a vital initiative that integrates and enhances various anti-fraud actions across the EU. Spanning seven years and concluding in 2027, the UAFP is supported by a budget of €181 million.

The programme is structured into three distinct components. The first, formerly known as Hercule, allocates funds to Member States for safeguarding the EU's financial interests, including financing for specialised anti-fraud equipment and devices. Noteworthy examples of this strand of funding include the acquisition of a submarine drone in Spain and of a powerful patrol boat in Ireland, both instrumental in combating smuggling activities. Hercule also supports specific training initiatives and conferences.

The second component focuses on the Irregularity Management System, operating under the Anti-Fraud Information System. Utilised by 35 countries, this system streamlines the reporting of financial irregularities and suspected fraud, enhancing transparency and accountability.

The third component invests in the advancement, operation, and upkeep of the Anti-Fraud Information

System platform. This platform is crucial for the secure exchange of information related to mutual assistance and supports activities like joint customs operations, practical courses, and preparatory or evaluation meetings for operational actions.

Under the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2028-2034, anti-fraud funding will undergo transformative changes transitioning into the proposed Regulation for a Single Market and Customs Programme<sup>6</sup>. This initiative aims to consolidate existing forms of Union funding covering policy areas like internal market, company law, competition policy, financial services, consumers, European statistics, customs, taxation cooperation, and anti-fraud.


Merging these policy areas into a single financing programme presents substantial opportunities for synergy, budgetary flexibility to address unforeseen challenges, streamlined access to funding for applicants, and reduced administrative burdens. In line with this vision, the Commission has proposed to double the anti-fraud programme's budget to €362 million, enhancing current activities and enabling greater financial support for combating fraud and illegal activities impacting the EU's financial interests.

## Republic of Ireland – Office of Revenue Commissioners (ORC - Customs)



In 2025 Revenue Ireland launched its new Customs vessel Cosaint (the Irish for protection). The €8.5 million cutter was co-financed by the UAFP to the tune of €1.8m (the largest financial programme contribution so far in one project). Cosaint now patrols Ireland's 3,173km coastline, significantly enhancing the ability of Revenue's Maritime Unit to undertake effective patrol duties and combat smuggling.

## Spain – Guardia Civil (UCO – Central Operative Unit)



€720 000 was awarded to the Central Operating Unit (UCO) of the Guardia Civil to develop new technological ways to fight against large criminal organisations' increasingly complex fraud and smuggling activities. This project allowed for the development and purchase of such tools as specialised equipment for surveillance, new patrol and surveillance vehicles and a 3D printer.

<sup>6</sup> Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 September 2025 establishing the Single Market and Customs Programme for the period 2028-2034 and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/444, (EU) 2021/690, (EU) 2021/785, (EU) 2021/847 and (EU) 2021/1077, COM(2025) 590 final.

## Greece - DOCK2

80% funded by the UAFP DOCK2 supplies specialised technical equipment to strengthen the technical capabilities of Greece's Drug Enforcement Sub-Directorate of the Directorate for Combating Organised Crime. DOCK2 helps Greek authorities address smuggling into the EU particularly through its largest Ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki. The equipment is used in collaboration with other services of the Greek Police, as well as public services of the country such as Customs and Port Authorities during investigations of the activity of criminal networks at National, European and International levels.

## Spain – Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (AEAT – Customs)



Spain is a gateway to the rest of Europe for legitimate trade. However, it is also a gateway for smugglers. Especially tobacco smugglers. One hive of smuggling activity is in the bay of Algeciras, near the Spain/Gibraltar border. As a result, the AEAT used UFAP funds buy two semi-rigid boats, equipped with a powerful engine, that have been successfully used to combat tobacco smuggling in the area.

### Recommended action

OLAF supports the proposal to double the UAFP allocation within the new MFF and is working on strategies to allocate such funds most effectively, also by inducing a more even geographical distribution.

The funding within a broader instrument will need to guarantee OLAF's operational independence. While fluctuations across priorities in such an instrument are natural, core funding of OLAF's investigative activities will have to remain guaranteed.



## Direct access to VAT data

The European Commission recently presented a proposal for a Council Regulation Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the access of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to value added tax information at Union level, COM(2025) 685 final<sup>7</sup> to enhance cooperative efforts between the EPPO, OLAF, and Member States in combating cross-border VAT fraud more effectively. The main aim of the proposal is giving OLAF and the EPPO access to IT systems with relevant VAT information at Union level.

This initiative intends to facilitate speedier investigations through near-real-time digital reporting of cross-border trade, granting the EPPO and OLAF direct and centralised access to VAT data. Additionally, the propo-

sal establishes direct communication channels between the EPPO, OLAF, and Eurofisc, the European network of national officials dedicated to combating VAT fraud.

The disparity between anticipated and actual VAT receipts in the EU amounted to approximately €89.3 billion in 2022, with carousel fraud, or Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud alone costing between €12.5 and €32.8 billion annually. Often orchestrated by criminal organisations, this type of fraud poses substantial challenges to financial integrity and efficient collection of tax revenues.

The above-mentioned proposal requires further adoption by unanimity by the Council. It is consistent with the legislation of the VAT in the Digital Age package, which was adopted in March 2025<sup>8</sup>. Among its provisions are the extensive use of electronic invoicing and near-real-time digital reporting for intra-EU B2B trade, set to be implemented from July 2030. This strategic package aims to modernize VAT systems and close loopholes exploited by fraudsters.

<sup>7</sup> Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the access of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to value added tax information at Union level, COM(2025) 685 final

<sup>8</sup> Council Regulation (EU) 2025/517 of 11 March 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the VAT administrative cooperation arrangements needed for the digital age (OJ L, 2025/517, 25.3.2025).



# Member States

Building strong relations with EU anti-fraud actors and national authorities to protect the EU budget and financial interests is a key objective of OLAF. Developing strong working partnerships with these partners allows OLAF greater flexibility and oversight when it comes to identifying, investigating and preventing fraud and wrongdoing. This cooperation is especially important when it comes to tackling cross-border frauds.

The following section highlights some of our cooperation activities with Member States in 2025 and provide key anti-fraud information about each country.



## Belgium

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



### 2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

Planned adoption of NAFS;  
AFS implemented (regional, sectoral national/regional, authority level, programme level)


#### AFCOS

Commission Interdépartementale pour la Coordination de la Lutte contre les Fraudes dans les secteurs économiques (CICF / ICCF)




#### ACAs

Administrative Arrangement on Cooperation and Exchange of Information with the Belgian 'Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières/ Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking' (CRIF/CFI), signed in March 2022



## Bulgaria

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



#### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Ministry of Interior,  
AFCOS Directorate



#### ACAs

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria, signed in January 2021



## Czechia

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



### 3 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Ministry of Finance,  
Department 47 -  
"Central Harmonisation Unit", Unit 4703



#### ACAs

Cooperation Arrangement with the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of the Czech Republic in the Fight against fraud and other irregularities detrimental to the communities' financial interests during the Phase prior to the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union, signed in January 2002.



## Glossary

**NAFS** : National Anti-Fraud Strategy


**AFS** : Anti-Fraud Strategy

**AFCOS** : Anti-Fraud Coordination Services

**ACA** : Administrative Cooperation Arrangement

**UAFP** : Union Anti-Fraud Programme

\*These tables do not contain data on investigations on EU funds managed directly by EU institutions and bodies. Such investigations may concern economic operators in several Member States or third countries. Although OLAF carries out such investigations often with the support of the national authorities, the complexity of the investigations does not make it possible to attribute them to a specific Member State or third country.



**Denmark**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**Anti-fraud strategies**

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national, authority level, programme level)

**AFCOS**

Ministry of Finance, Centre for Climate, Environment and the EU



**Other activities**

Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, July – December 2025



High-Level Conference on Customs Fraud - From Budapest to Copenhagen, 11 - 13 November 2025



**Germany**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**6 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (regional, sectoral regional, anti-corruption, authority level, programme level)

**AFCOS**

Federal Ministry for Finance, Department EA 6




**ACAs**

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement between the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed in November 2014

**Other activities**

OLAF hosted a joint delegation from German police of Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia on 13 November



**Estonia**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**Anti-fraud strategies**

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national, anti-corruption, authority level)

**AFCOS**

Ministry of Finance, Financial Control Department



**Ireland**

**2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

AFS implemented (other)


**AFCOS**

Department of Finance, International & EU Division, EU Budget Section



**Greece**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national, anti-corruption)


**AFCOS**

National Transparency Authority (NTA) - Governor's Office General; Directorate of Integrity & Accountability AFCOS Independent Unit



**Spain**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**12 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (regional, sectoral national, anti-corruption, authority level)

**AFCOS**

Servicio Nacional de Coordinación Antifraude Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública



**ACAs**

Cooperation Agreement between the General Council of Notaries (CNG) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), signed in March 2023

Cooperation Agreement between the European Anti-Fraud Office and the College of Registrars for obtaining formal commercial disclosure of registers and consultation of the beneficial ownership of commercial companies by means of the business register, signed in July 2023

Cooperation Arrangement between the 'Fiscalía General del Estado' of Spain and the European Anti-Fraud Office, signed in January 2008

Protocol Technique d'Accord entre le Ministère de l'Intérieur - Direction Générale de la Guardia Civil - et la Direction F (UCLAF) du Secrétariat Général de la Commission Européenne

**Other activities**



OLAF Director-General's mission to Madrid, Spain, 16-18 March 2025

Study visit from EOI (School of Industrial Organization) & Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 17 September 2025


MEP Barrena's visit to OLAF together with a group of MPs from the Basque Parliament in view of a new law against corruption practices, 4 March 2025





## France

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Mission Interministérielle de Coordination Anti Fraude (MICAF)



#### ACAs


Arrangement de Partenariat avec le Conseil National des Greffiers des Tribunaux de Commerce, signed in June 2023

Arrangement Spécifique de Mise à Disposition des Informations des Greffes des Tribunaux de Commerce, Accès par Voie Electronique, avec Infogreffe, Groupement d'Intérêt Economique, signed in June 2023



## Croatia

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

### Anti-fraud strategies

AFS implemented (sectoral national, anti-corruption, authority level, programme level)


#### AFCOS

Ministry of Finance, Directorate for Financial Management, Internal Audit and Supervision Service for Coordination of the Anti-Fraud Coordination System related to EU funds



## Italy

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



12 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Italian Anti-fraud coordination service (IT-AFCOS); Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Department for European Affairs; Committee for combating fraud against the European Union (COLAF)



#### ACAs

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the General Prosecution Office of the Italian Court of Auditors (Procura Generale della Corte dei Conti), signed in September 2013

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Guardia di Finanza, signed in June 2012

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Italian National Anticorruption Authority (A.N.A.C.), signed in April 2016

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo, signed in January 2017

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement between with the Carabinieri, signed in May 2017

### Other activities



'BETKONEXT' Workshop 'New evidence on Fraud Schemes, Regulatory Gaps and Administrative Challenges', in collaboration with the Italian AFCOS, at OLAF, 27 October 2025



Two visits from Guardia di Finanza to OLAF, 24 and 30 September 2025 (Brussels)



## Cyprus

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



### Anti-fraud strategies

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (programme level)

#### AFCOS

Treasury of the Republic, Verifications and Certification Directorate



### Other activities

(acting) OLAF Director-General mission to Cyprus, 26-27 November 2025



## Latvia

### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



9 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Ministry of Finance, EU Funds Audit Department, Anti-Fraud Coordination Service of Latvia



#### ACAs

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Latvia, signed in October 2013

### Other activities

Study visit at OLAF from the Anticorruption Office (KNAB) of Latvia, in the framework of BACPE (Best Anti-Corruption Practice Exchanged) Project to visit other EPAC/EACN members, 25-26 February





**Lithuania**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**8 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (anti-corruption)

**AFCOS**

Ministry of the Interior, Financial Crime Investigation Service



**Other activities**



Study visit at OLAF from the Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania (STT), in the framework of BACPE (Best Anti-Corruption Practice Exchanged) Project to visit other EPAC/EACN members, 25-26 February



**Luxembourg**

**3 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (authority level)


**AFCOS**

Ministry of Finance, Directorate of International Financial Relations, Development Aid and Compliance



**Hungary**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**6 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

NAFS implemented; AFS implemented (anti-corruption)

**AFCOS**

National Tax and Customs Administration, Central Management, OLAF Coordination Bureau, Anti-Fraud Coordination Service



**ACAs**

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement between the European Anti-Fraud Office and the Office of the Prosecutor General of Hungary, signed in February 2022

Exchange of Letters on official cooperation between the European Anti-Fraud Office and the Hungarian Integrity Authority, signed in December 2023



**Malta**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**Anti-fraud strategies**

NAFS implemented

**AFCOS**

Office of the Prime Minister, IAID Cabinet Office, Internal Audit and Investigations Department



**Netherlands**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**Anti-fraud strategies**

Planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national)

**AFCOS**

Douane Informatiecentrum - DIC (Customs Information Centre) Douane Nederland (Douane Rotterdam Rijnmond)



**Other Activities**

24th EPAC/EACN Annual Professional Conference and General Assembly, the Hague, 24-25 November 2025



**Austria**

**Investigations concluded 2021-25**



**Anti-fraud strategies**

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national)


**AFCOS**

Federal Ministry for Finance, Department for Anti-fraud, Tax and Customs



**Poland**

**Investigations concluded\* 2021-25**



**25 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)**

**Anti-fraud strategies**

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (programme level)

**AFCOS**

Ministry of Finance, Department for Audit of Public Funds



**Other activities**

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 January – 30 June 2025



Tailored-made workshop at OLAF for the Supreme Audit Office (NIK), 25-26 November





### Portugal

#### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



#### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented


#### AFCOS

Inspeção-Geral de Finanças (IGF)



### Romania

#### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



19 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented; AFS implemented (authority level, programme level)

#### AFCOS

Government of Romania, DLAF - Fight Against Fraud Department



#### ACAs

Protocol with the National Trade Register Office (NTRO), signed in May 2025

#### Other activities



Annual conference of External Aid Agencies of EU Member States and EEA countries, Bucharest, 22 - 24 October 2025



### Slovenia

1 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (authority level)


#### AFCOS

Ministry of Finance, Budget Supervision Office of the Republic of Slovenia



### Slovakia

#### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

NAFS implemented

#### AFCOS

Government Office of the Slovak Republic, Section of Control



### Finland

2 UAFP awarded grants (2021-24)

#### Anti-fraud strategies

AFS implemented (sectoral national, anti-corruption)

#### AFCOS

Ministry of Finance, Government Financial Controller's Function



#### Other activities



2025 Helsinki OLAF Conference (joint event of 3rd Expenditure Conference and the Annual AFCOS meeting), 10-12 June 2025

(acting) OLAF Director-General met with the Deputy State Secretary for European Affairs, 26 August 2025



### Sweden

#### Investigations concluded\* 2021-25



#### Anti-fraud strategies

No planned adoption of NAFS; AFS implemented (sectoral national)

#### AFCOS

Swedish Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten)



#### ACAs


Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), signed in June 2013

#### Other activities



Tailored-made workshop at OLAF for the Swedish Economic Crime Authority, 15-16 January





# Cooperation with partners

## Cooperation with EU Institutions and bodies

### European Parliament

In 2025, there was significant engagement with Members of the European Parliament, particularly within the Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) and the Budget Committee (BUDG) both of which visited OLAF last year. Key activities included private/in-camera hearings, exchanges of views on the RRF, and public hearings focused on customs authorities' roles in protecting EU financial interests. Active participation during plenary sessions and bilateral meetings contributed to discussions on the PIF report, on the ongoing review of the EU Anti-fraud Architecture, and on the proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework.

Meetings were also held, for example, with the Verkhovna Rada (the Unicameral Parliament of Ukraine) and a group of Southeast Asian Members of Parliament to address anti-corruption efforts. In 2025, OLAF also organised EU anti-fraud workshops and seminars with the EPPO.

### Events



14 January: Visit of the CONT committee and organisation of a tailored-made workshop



14 May: Visit of BUDG committee and organisation of a tailored-made workshop





## European Court of Auditors

Operational cooperation between the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and OLAF continued in 2025. The ECA informs OLAF of any suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the EU's financial interests that it uncovers during its audit activity. Last year, OLAF initiated 16 selection cases and opened 4 investigations based on information reported by ECA.


OLAF collaborated with ECA in two audits that were finalised in 2025. OLAF was the main auditee of the ECA [Special Report EU bodies fighting fraud](#), which assessed the cooperation between OLAF, the EPPO, Eurojust, and Europol in the framework of the EU's anti-fraud architecture (further details are provided in the 'Policy Developments' section).

OLAF was also among the auditees of the Special Report on Value Added Tax (VAT) fraud on imports, which highlights the importance of addressing VAT fraud and recommends, among others, ways to strengthen the regulatory framework for simplified import customs procedures and enhanced cooperation between tax and customs authorities.

## The European Public Prosecutor's Office

During 2025, OLAF opened 51 new complementary investigations and sent 93 reports to the EPPO, out of which 59% resulted in the opening of an EPPO investigation. The increasing number of complementary investigations requested by the EPPO attests to the value placed on OLAF's unique experience and expertise. This trend was felt in all areas of activity, from expenditure to internal investigations and revenue.

### Cases sent to the EPPO by OLAF in 2025 by investigative area



# Cooperation with partners in the EU and beyond

In 2025, OLAF continued to broaden and strengthen its network of international partners and signed five new administrative cooperation arrangements (ACA) with a particular focus on Latin America. OLAF enhanced cooperation against customs fraud and illicit trade by signing four arrangements with the Customs Administration of Honduras, the Directorate General of Customs of El Salvador, the National Customs Service of Ecuador, and the Superintendence of Tax Administration of Guatemala. In addition, OLAF signed an arrangement with the Nordic Investment Bank in order to facilitate the information exchange and coordination of common activities.

By the end of 2025, OLAF had 42 such arrangements in place with national authorities worldwide and 17 with offices of international organisations.

OLAF also continued working closely with Member States to support them in their efforts to combat customs fraud. OLAF has established an annual high-level dialogue with national authorities to discuss challenges and operational solutions in this area.

In November 2025, OLAF and the Danish Presidency organised the fourth edition of this high-level dialogue in Copenhagen. The event, building upon the outcome of the 2024 Budapest Conference, discussed the anti-fraud work currently developed by OLAF and Member States and explored the best way of addressing common threats to the Union’s financial interests and security.

The Conference allowed participants to report on the challenges in customs fraud, their priorities and needs in this respect, and the possible solutions OLAF can develop to support national efforts. OLAF also provided, and will continue to provide, targeted training on data analysis tools and techniques for customs anti-fraud purposes.



Other conferences that OLAF hosted or co-hosted in 2025 include:



22 January - In collaboration with the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and the Moldovan customs authorities, OLAF delivered a high-level training session in Chisinau aimed at enhancing Moldova’s capacity to combat the circumvention of EU sanctions.



19-20 March - OLAF hosted a workshop for a group from the Prosecutor's Office in Bosnia & Herzegovina.



1-2 July – OLAF and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) co-organised a conference in Alicante, Spain to discuss current and emerging trends in intellectual property (IP) crime related to the sector of Fast-Moving-Consumer-Goods (FMCG). Such goods include personal care and home care items, packaged food, snacks, soft drinks and household batteries. These goods are often targeted by counterfeiters due to high consumer demand, short shelf lives and high turnover that reaches hundreds of billions every year. The event brought together more than 50 participants, including customs officers, police, market surveillance authorities, EU and international bodies, and representatives from the industry.



20-23 May – Along with the Romanian Police and Romania's Department for the Fight Against Fraud (DLAF), OLAF hosted European anti-fraud specialists in Bucharest to discuss the use of digital tools to fight fraud against the EU budget. The meeting focused on strengthening cross-border cooperation and improving the detection and investigation of fraud through advanced digital means.



8-9 October – OLAF hosted the AFCOS Seminar for EU candidate and potential candidate countries in Tirana, Albania. Participants representing the 10 countries discussed challenges in the accession process and practical ways to strengthen transparency.





11-12 June - OLAF organised the Expenditure & AFCOS Conference in Helsinki that brought together EU Member States to discuss the Anti-Fraud Architecture Review.




22-24 October - With the Romanian Agency for International Development (RoAid) OLAF co-organised the InvestigAid 2025 Conference in Bucharest, entitled 'Aid Under Scrutiny: Trends and Patterns in a Changing World'. The event featured speakers from a range of international actors such as the Directorate-General for International Partnerships of the European Commission's (DG INTPA), the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), USAID, Global Affairs Canada, the German Development Agency GIZ, AFD France and several European and national investigative bodies.









# Statistical Annex




**Selections completed and their duration 2021-2025**




**Percentage of ongoing investigations lasting more than 20 months 2021-2025**





- Average duration of investigation
- Average duration of selection corresponding to these cases

**Average duration of closed investigations (in months) 2021-2025**



**Incoming information by source 2021-2025**

- Private
- Public

# Learn more on the Digital OLAF Report



**Communicating with OLAF**

<https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/>

**Reporting fraud to OLAF**

[https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/olaf-and-you/report-fraud\\_en](https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/olaf-and-you/report-fraud_en)

**Complaining about an OLAF investigation**

[https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/olaf-and-you/complaints-and-requests\\_en](https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/olaf-and-you/complaints-and-requests_en)

**Requesting information on OLAF**

[https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/contacts/general-contact-details\\_en](https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/contacts/general-contact-details_en)

**Media:**

[https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/contacts/media-enquiries\\_en](https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/contacts/media-enquiries_en)

**Mailing address:**

European Commission/European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)/1049 Brussels, Belgium

**Address for visitors:**

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)/Rue Joseph II 30/1000 Brussels, Belgium

The European Anti-Fraud Office is commonly known as OLAF, which is the acronym of its title in French, Office européen de lutte antifraude.

